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ARIZONA v. CALIFORNIAt-A BRIEF REVIEW
DAVID HABER*

It is a commonplace that our great interstate streams are as
troublesome as they are important. The trouble stems from technology only to the extent that we are not yet able to make water so
plentiful at so low a cost that no management of its "scarcity" is
called for. It is this need for regulating human affairs, the task of
providing for competing claims to a "scarce" resource which poses
the greater difficulty-a difficulty which becomes intensified by expanding population and increased industrialization. Here, as is true
of our era generally, our progress in solving the human problem has
not kept pace with technology.
The intense and protracted struggle over the Colorado River and
its tributaries reflects this state of affairs. The more the engineers
were able to tame this wild river, the more its waters were made
available to serve human needs, the more future plans for development and use were projected, and the more intense seemed to become
the struggle for water between some of the states through which the
river flows. True, the prospect of extensive federal development 1
and the fear that rapidly growing California would acquire, under a
possible application of the "prior appropriation" doctrine to disputes between the states, 2 the largest portion of the river's flow produced an agreement, the 1922 Colorado River Compact, 3 which
quieted the apprehension of the upper users by allocating to them a
specific quantity of the water of the "river system." But the Compact
was not signed by Arizona. 4 Moreover, the Compact left unsettled
the division of water between the Lower Basin states. The chief contenders were Arizona and California. California continued to de-

l 373 U.S. 546 (1963). For the decree see 84 Sup. Ct. 755 (1964).
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University, Newark, N.J.
I wish to thank Professor Eva Morreale, my colleague, for her valuable assistance,
although she does not necessarily share all my views. I also wish to acknowledge
my general indebtedness to Professor Frank Trelease for having written the article
which I cite in note 7 infra.
1. See Fall-Davis Report, S. Doc. No. 142, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922).
2. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
3. 70 Cong. Rec. 324 (1928). See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Documents on the Use
and Control of Interstate and International Streams 39 (1956).
4. In 1944, after the six-state ratification which made the Compact effective under
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928), Arizona did ratify. Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 558 n.24 (1963).
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mand a larger portion of the Lower Basin flow than Arizona would
grant, and Arizona refused to guarantee that a portion of its Colorado River tributary waters, principally those of the Gila River, be
allocated to meet any obligation the United States might have to
5
Mexico.
Finally, in 1928, Congress, as part of its authorization for further
development of the Colorado River, enacted the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, 6 a result of much legislative maneuver and compromise,
which contained provisions which could be interpreted to govern
many of the disputed issues between the Lower Basin states. But the
dispute continued, nevertheless. In addition to the 7,500,000 acrefeet of water allocated annually to the Lower Basin by the 1922
Compact, California eventually wanted to use substantial amounts
of mainstream water to extend its irrigation in the Imperial, Coachella, and Palo Verde Valleys and for increasing diversions to the
coastal cities. Its contention was that Arizona, through its use of
tributary waters, had more than an adequate share of the river basin's supply. Arizona, on the other hand, in addition to free use of
the tributaries, wanted at least 2,800,000 acre-feet from the main
stream so as to assure dependable operation of the proposed Central Arizona Project,7 which had been shelved in Congress pending
some assurance of Arizona's allotment." As a result, in 1952 Arizona sued California in the United States Supreme Court. Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, and the United States became parties to the
proceeding, and in 1963 the Supreme Court rendered its historic decision.9 The justice of this decision and its scope will be disputed for
a long time. But there can be no question that in the absence of extensive congressional action to undo the decision's effect, 10 it will be
recognized as a major step in bringing order to the management of
this important stream and as an important precedent for resolving
other jurisdictional disputes over the waters of the Western States.
The Court's sweeping opinion rejected all contentions based on
5. See Hearings on H.R. 577 Before the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31, 402-05 (1928). These Hearings are discussed by
Mr. Justice Black in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1963).
6. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928). For earlier attempts to legislate in this area see H.R. 11449,
67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922) ; S. 727, H.R. 2903, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923) ; S. 3331,
H.R. 9826, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
7. See Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People,
States, and Nation, Kurland, The Supreme Court Review 158, 164-65 (1963).
8. Arizona v. California, Report of the Special Master 130 (1960).
9. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
10. A sample of congressional action is H.R. 9364, Dec. 5, 1963.
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prior appropriation and equitable apportionment 1 which, in the absence of a compact,' 2 are the usual doctrines that have governed judicial allocation of water between the states. Recognizing that the
1922 Compact did not settle the allocation between Lower Basin
states and that the states, despite a provision in the Boulder Canyon
Project Actia inviting a compact on this issue, failed to reach further
agreement, the Court held that the Project Act and the actions of
the Secretary of the Interior, authorized thereby, allocated the supply in the following manner: ( 1 ) Under section 4(a) of the Project
Act, Congress provided as an alternative contingency prior to authorizing the building of Hoover Dam that six states, including California, sign the Colorado River Compact, which was already the
case, and that California by legislation, which it enacted, would limit
its uses to 4.4 million acre-feet per year of the 7.5 million allotted to
the Lower Basin plus one-half of any unappropriated surplus. (2)
Other allocations in the Lower Basin, according to the Court, were
to be made by the Secretary of the Interior. 4 This judgment was
based on the following sections of the Project Act and its somewhat
confused legislative history :15 (a) section 5 authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to contract for storage and delivery of water to users,
and these contracts were a prerequisite to any right to use water; and
(b) section 8 (b) provided that if the states were to agree to the previously mentioned compact regarding Lower Basin allocations, to
which the Act urged them to agree, then even these compact allocations were to be subject to the Secretary's contracts entered into
prior to the compact. Presumably, this provision was viewed by the
Court as supporting its theory that in the absence of a further compact, allocations among the Lower Basin states, other than those
11. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589 (1945).
12. There was a suggestion that even a compact must conform to equitable apportionment. In Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938), the Court stressed that the purpose of a compact was equitable apportionment
and that individuals in the state cannot claim more than the state's "equitable share."
13. 45 Stat. 1058 (1928).
14. The language in this portion of the opinion is not entirely free from ambiguity.
Thus, at times the Court speaks as if the Project Act somehow apportioned all of the
water, with the Secretary merely carrying out the specific division demanded in the Act.
Yet, the only specific division is in the proposed compact between the Lower Basin
states which was not agreed to. Therefore, it seems reasonable to read the opinion as
stating that aside from the California limitation the Act merely provided for a machinery of allocation. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 593 (1963). But see note 37 intra.
15. For typical colloquy of the legislators see Arizona v. California, Report of the
Special Master 156, 199 (1960).
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provided for in section 4(a), were to be effected by the Secretary.
That the power of the Secretary was one of allocation was further
indicated by a provision that in the case of domestic and irrigation
users, these contracts were to be for "permanent service."'" (3) The
authorized allocation, according to the Court, was effected by the
Secretary when he made contracts with particular users in California
totaling 5.362 million acre-feet annually (construed as 4.4 million
plus a portion of the surplus mentioned in section 4(a)), with Arizona for 2.8 million acre-feet, and with Nevada for 300,000 acrefeet. As to shortages, the Court held that the Secretary can do as he
sees fit within the limits of the purposes of the Project Act.
Subsidiary to this main aspect of the decision, but most important
to the states involved, the Court decided that whether the Colorado
River Compact dealt with the entire water system or just the main
stream, the Project Act itself, despite its reference to the Colorado
River Compact, clearly allocated only the main stream water which
the Upper Basin states under that Compact were obliged to let
pass through Lee Ferry, Arizona, the dividing line between the Upper and Lower Basin states. The allocation of this 7.5 million acrefeet of main stream water among the Lower Basin states was in no
way to depend on the extent of the use that these states, principally
Arizona, made of their tributaries.17 The Court also decided, contrary to the Master, that the states can be charged for any diversions of main stream water between Lee Ferry and Lake Mead. 5
In addition to allocating the water among the Lower Basin states,
the Court's opinion purports to authorize the Secretary of the In16. 45 Stat. 1060 (1928). This requirement applies only to contracts for irrigation
and domestic uses (defined to include industrial uses in art. 2(h) of the original Compact). The actual contracts contain many clauses which, if valid, would seem to permit
the Secretary to reduce or perhaps even eliminate the "permanent service." See Arizona
v. California, Report of the Special Master 399, 409, 423 (1960).
17. Article 3(a) of the Compact provides for 7.5 million acre-feet for consumptive
use in the Lower Basin. Article 3 (d) provides that ten times 7.5 million is to be allowed
to pass at Lee Ferry over a ten-year period, i.e., an average of 7.5 per year. The
Master stated that of the 7.5 million per year passing Lee Ferry, a substantial amount
will be lost on the way to the places of consumptive use. Id. at 144.
Whether this means the 7.5 average which must pass by Lee Ferry is to be allocated
there for consumptive use elsewhere and the transportation losses are to be borne by
the users, or whether this means that an amount additional to what flows at Lee Ferry
must be made available somehow to the users, is only indirectly answered by the
opinion through the elimination of the tributaries from the accounting between the
Lower Basin states. The actual contracts measure the amount at the point of diversion.
Id. at 403, 412, 429.
18. On the other hand, it is not clear that the Secretary has contracting power over
this water. See note 37 infra.
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terior to allocate the main stream water through his section 5 contract power among individual users within the states without any regard for the states' prior appropriation law or other state water
laws. This construes the Project Act as giving him broad powers of
water management which generally were thought to have been left
to the states under most previous interpretations of federal laws,
including the reclamation laws.1 9 Of course, there had been some
earlier indication that the Court might not view the power of the
states to be as broad as generally believed. One such indication
stressed by the Court in Arizona v. Californiawas its language previously used in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken.0 In Ivanhoe, the
Court held that seciton 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902,21 which
required the Secretary to proceed in conformity with state law, did
not empower a state to force the Secretary to deliver water beyond
the federally imposed 160 acre limitation, and said:
As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with
state law when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation
project, it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested
interests therein. But the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the operation of federal projects. 22
Then, quoting from Nebraska v. Wyoming2 3 to the effect that where
Congress has provided a system of regulation for federal projects it
need not give way before an inconsistent state system, the Court
concluded in Ivanhoe: "We read nothing in § 8 that compels the
United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the
24
State.

'

This interpretation of section 8 became important in the Arizona
case because section 14 of the Project Act makes the Secretary subject to the provisions of the Reclamation law, except as the Act
otherwise provides. Relying on the above language from Ivanhoe,
the majority in Arizona held that the provisions of the Reclamation
19. See Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) ; Trelease,
188-90.
20. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
21. 32 Stat. 370 (1902), 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1958).
22. Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275,
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 586 (1963).
23. 325 U.S. 589, 615 (1945).
24. Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275,
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 586 (1963) ; see also First
Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).

op. cit. supra note 7, at 183-84,

291 (1958), quoted in Arizona
292 (1958), quoted in Arizona
Iowa Hydro-electric Co-op. v.
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law did not require the Secretary to follow state law in his scheme
of allocation. And section 18 of the Project Act which provides that
the Act shall not interfere with such "rights as the States now
have" either "to the waters" or to "enact such laws . . . with
respect to the appropriation of waters," 25 was also held not to require the Secretary to follow state law. This is because the states'
powers are always subject to the superior power of the federal government to control navigable waters "for purposes of flood control,
navigation, power generation, and other objects" and are subsidiary
to the power of Congress "to promote the general welfare through
projects for reclamation, irrigation, or other internal improvements." 20
The Court held that congressional authorization of the Secretary
to allocate among individual users was mandatory and rejected a
contention by Nevada that the Secretary, under the contract with it,
had relinquished any power to make further individual contracts
within the limits of the total amount designated in the state contract. The Court felt that such a conclusion "would . . . transfer
from the Secretary to Nevada . . . the . . . power to determine
with whom he will contract and on what terms. ' 27 Nevertheless, the
Secretary's discretion is not to be unlimited. He is bound by the
terms of the original Compact regarding the division between the
Upper and Lower Basin states. He can not exceed the limits imposed on California by section 4(a) of the Project Act. Moreover,
section 6 establishes certain priorities. The reservoir is to be used
first for "river regulation, improvement of navigation and flood
control," second "for irrigation and domestic uses and satisfaction
of present perfected rights" (which the Court characterized as of
intense importance to those who had reduced their water rights to
actual beneficial use at the time the Act became effective), and third
"for power." 2 8s Additional standards limiting the Secretary's discretion, according to the Court, were to be found in the requirement
that the contracts must yield adequate revenues to recover expenses
within fifty years and in the provision, previously mentioned, that
contracts for irrigation and domestic use must be for "permanent
service."
25.
26.
27.
28.

45 Stat. 1065 (1928).
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 587 (1963).
Id. at 592.
45 Stat. 1061 (1928), quoted in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 584 (1963).
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This much for the major issues decided. The dissenters, Justices
Harlan, Stewart, and Douglas, wanted ordinary judicial allocation
principles to apply. Their reading of the legislative history and the
provisions of the Boulder Canyon Project Act led them to conclude
that Congress did not allocate the water among the Lower Basin
states nor authorize the Secretary of the Interior to do so; his contract power was merely a revenue measure. The constitutionality of
delegating to the Secretary so much power without adequate standards was questioned. And Mr. Justice Douglas was especially
shocked by the authorization of the Secretary to allocate water to
individual users without regard to state law, which he believes is
required by the Project Act and the reclamation laws. He also objected strenously, on the basis of his reading of the legislative history, to the elimination of the tributaries from the Lower Basin
allocation scheme.
In this short article it is impossible to detail and evaluate these
arguments. A brief estimate of the likely impact of the decision will
have to suffice. First, the decision establishes congressional legislation as a device for the apportionment of an interstate stream. This
possibility had been foreshadowed by many prior cases interpreting
29. The Court also accepted a compromise settlement between Arizona and New
Mexico concerning conflicting claims to Gila River water. This settlement had been
accepted by the Master, after he had first dealt with the dispute, on the basis of
equitable apportionment.
The Court also granted claims by the United States to waters in the main stream
and some of the tributaries for use on Indian reservations, national forests, recreational
and wildlife areas, and other government lands and works. The Court held that claims
by Indian reservations against the states need not be settled under the doctrine of
equitable apportionment because (1) Indian reservations are not states, and (2) they
are at any rate "governed by the statutes and Executive Orders creating the reservations." Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 594-97 (1963).
The Court held that after Arizona became a state, only the shores and lands underlying navigable waters became its property. But the broad powers of the federal
government to regulate navigable waters under the commerce clause and to regulate
government lands under article IV, § 3 of the Constitution remained unlimited. Under
these powers, the federal government can reserve water rights for its reservations and
other property, and this can be done by Executive Order. Such a reservation can also
arise by implication where the lands involved are arid and water rights once reserved,
if this was done before the Project Act became effective, are "present perfected rights"
entitled to priority under the Act. The quantity of water involved can include the
amount needed for future use. All uses of main stream water by the United States are
to be charged against the state's apportionment, and the United States is not entitled, as
it claimed, "to the use, without charge against its consumption, of any waters that would
have been wasted but for salvage by the Government on its wildlife preserves." Id. at
597-601.
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the ever-expanding power of Congress to control navigation.3 0 But
this decision, without elaborate discussion of the constitutional issue,
explicitly recognizes this power for the first time. Moreover, the
opinion's reference to the "general welfare" power suggests that
this congressional power will, if the occasion requires, also be held
to extend to nonnavigable streams or, at the very least, to the nonnavigable tributaries of navigable streams.3'
Second, the opinion holds that the Secretary of the Interior has
the power to allocate water within a state through contracts, without regard to the state's water allocation laws and under very broad
standards established by federal law. While the particular resolution of the constitutional issue of improper delegation does not seem
too surprising at this stage of development of administrative law,
the opinion is novel in its interpretation of the usual boiler plate in
federal water laws seeking to protect the rights of the states and to
preserve state laws. This language is said to do no more than protect individual rights perfected prior to the federal legislation and
guarantee to the states the power to regulate in ways "not inconsistent with" the legislation. In this respect, the opinion might affect
not only the Secretary's power granted by the Boulder Canyon
Project Act but also his powers under the Reclamation Act, since
section 8 of that law was the subject of part of this aspect of the
decision. As previously indicated, although earlier decisions had
somewhat limited the states' powers to regulate waters under the
jurisdiction of certain federal agencies, the construction adopted in
Arizona v. California goes much further than what had generally
been regarded to be the spirit of the federal laws.
From a policy perspective the outcome can be criticized for bestowing such extensive powers on the federal government and for
granting to the Secretary so much authority without very strict
limiting standards. Regionalism has long been a slogan even of the
most advanced thinkers in water law. And extensive state allocation
of water is part of the history of the West. When one adds to this
the relatively conservative political climate which in recent years
has made the Tennessee Valley Authority a showplace of the past
rather than a model for the future and has led to the demise of a
30. See Morreale, Federal Po'wer in Western Waters: The Nav~igation Power and
the Rule of No Compensation, 3 Natural Resources J. 1 (1963).
31. See Trelease, op. cit. supra note 7, at 181. Trelease also mentions the power
over governmentally stored waters, the treaty power, the war power, the property
clause, and the power to improve the public lands. He also mentions the power to consent to compacts. Id. at 183.
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proposed Missouri Valley Authority, there is little wonder that
regionalism and state power have become synonymous. As a result,
the compact was thought the best technique for attaining true regional water control, and generally in the area of allocation the
federal government was to stay in the background largely in the role
of a supporter and financier of the states' policies. There is little
wonder that none dared to change the boiler plate about state water
rights in the federal laws, despite its frequently ambiguous meaning.
The preference for preserving states' rights in connection with
federal projects reflects still another, somewhat archaic, standard
way of thinking about water law-that which establishes a dichotomy between problems of development and those of allocation. Yet
the extent of the need for development and the type of development
is affected by the type of allocation. Development costs can be reduced if the allocation is properly planned and if the conditions of
use are strictly enforced. It is therefore desirable that the development of water and the regulation of its use be integrated as fully as
possibleY2 Provision for compensation, so that no undue burden is
placed on certain individuals for the sake of benefits reaped by other
individuals or the public as a whole, can be achieved by making
water rights already in use compensable if taken away and by providing for a similar scheme in water use contracts or similar devices
with respect to new diversions which might later, because of new
construction or needs, have to be cut down or eliminated. 3
Of course, federal control is not necessarily a panacea. Aside
from conflict between federal agencies, which was one of the chief
difficulties in the Missouri Valley, the federal government might not
manage water from a regional perspective. A regional perspective
implies a regional unit of administration with development and allocation powers, whether it be created by compact with the federal
government as a participant or by the federal government alone.
Even a federally created agency can provide for state participa84
tion.
32. See Bower, Some Physical, Technological, and Economic Characteristics of
Water and Water Resources Systems: Implications for Administration, 3 Natural
Resources J. 215 (1963).
33. See Haber, Michigan Law of Water Allocation, Part lI-Evaluation: Protection of Investment, the Public Interest and State Water Policy, The Law of Water Allocation in the Eastern United States 417, 422-29 (Haber & Bergen eds. 1958).
34. See Martin, Birkhead, Burkhead & Munger, River Basin Administration and the
Delaware 141-42 (1960) ; U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Pacific Southwest Water Plan
VI-13 (1963) ; Comments of the State of California on the "Pacific Southwest Water
Plan" 7 (1963) (calling for establishment of Regional Commission). Cf. Comment,
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In view of the foregoing discussion, what are the policy accomplishments of Arizona v. California? First, the allocation problem
was transferred from the Court to the political and administrative
arenas where it belongs. The Court lacks the expertise, the time,
and the machinery to administer a river system. Second, the great
power given to the federal government has created the leverage
which will force the states to come to terms. This was a step which
seems to have been necessary in the absence of judicial apportionment, in view of the long history of the conflict along the Colorado
River. Third, these powers which are now said to be in the hands of
the executive and legislative branches of the federal government
make it possible to accomplish a fully integrated development-allocation scheme without interference of conflicting state authority. The
states will have to negotiate their participation politically, and there
is therefore a chance that the result may be a rational regional
scheme under which no single area of the region can completely
frustrate the desires and needs of the region as a whole. Fourth,
that no undue share of the cost will be placed on individual users
for the benefit of the entire community or for the benefit of other
individuals is assured to a certain extent by the protection of "present perfected rights" and the requirement that certain contracts be
for "permanent service." 35
The Arizona v. Californiadecision, like many others, is not completely free of ambiguities. Nor could it possibly deal with all hypothetical issues that might arise at a future date. For example, it is
not entirely clear whether the allocation between the Lower Basin
states is held to be fixed by the Project Act or by the Secretary's allocation, though most of the opinion must be read as leaning toward
the latter interpretation. 6 If it is the Secretary who fixed the allocations between the Lower Basin states, can he now change these allocations even in the absence of a shortage or a surplus? Is he
prohibited or restricted by the requirement that certain contracts be
for "permanent service"? Does the "permanent service" requirement mean that despite exculpatory language in the contracts the
Secretary can not, in the absence of a shortage, reduce or take away
the water from individual users with whom he has entered into
agreements? Can he do so but only upon payment of compensaGovernmental Techniques for the Conservation and Utilization of Water Resources:
An Analysis and Proposal, 56 Yale L.J. 276 (1947).
35. Cf. note 16 supra, note 37 infra, and text at 27, infra.
36. See note 14 supra.
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tion?37 Though the Compact calls for honoring present perfected
rights, the Project Act only gives these rights a second priority after
navigation and flood control requirements. Does this mean that
where navigation and flood control requirements interfere with
present perfected rights these must be compensated, since the Project Act is to be supplementary to the Compact? Can the Secretary
contract for water diverted between Lee Ferry and Lake Mead? If
not, how can he be sure the supply he contracted for below Lake
Mead will be available? Does the principle of equitable apportionment still apply between users of tributary waters prior to their
entering the Colorado River between Lee Ferry and Lake Mead
and claims by users in California to that water ?"
These and other issues might lead to future litigation unless Congress and the Secretary act to clarify some of the ambiguities and to
fill some of the gaps. But what is more important, the Arizona v.
California decision has opened the way for congressional action on
the Central Arizona Project " and for ultimate adoption of a Pacific
Southwest Water Plan, 40 which incorporates the Central Arizona
Project and provides for state and federal construction and enlargement of the California Aqueduct to bring water from northern
California to Southwestern areas. Many other features, such as a
pilot desalinization plant, a water recovery and conservation program, and new projects for supplying water to Nevada, New Mexico, and certain Indian reservations, have also been incorporated in
the proposed plan. Present proposals call for state advisory parti37. Since the writing of this article, the Court has issued its decree. Arizona v.
California, 84 Sup. Ct. 755 (1964). It seems to clarify some of the doubts stated above:
(1) it fixes the basic allocation between the states, thus indicating that the Secretary
of the Interior does not have unlimited discretion to alter these allocations; and (2)
it indicates that the Secretary's contracting power extends to water above Lake Mead.
38. This possibility is suggested by the Court's treatment of the Arizona-New Mexico dispute ; see note 29 supra.
39. See Hearings on S. 1658 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
40. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Pacific Southwest Water Plan (1963).
The Plan has been revised. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Pacific Southwest Water
Plan (1964). The pilot plant is no longer a part of the immediate proposal. In connection with the issue of state participation, the Plan provides:
To assure such coordination among Federal, State, interstate and local plans,
consistent with the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior under existing Colorado River legislation and the decree in Arizona v. California, it is
highly desirable that the authorizing legislation establish a regional water
commission modeled, to the extent appropriate, upon that set forth in Title
II of S. 1111, as supported by the Administration and as passed by the Senate.
Id. at VIII-7.

28
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cipation. Thus, Congress is confronted with the large opportunity to
integrate the water development and use control of the entire region
through an authority in which the states participate, if they consent
to do so, or through some similar administrative device. It should
be recalled in this connection that under the decision in Arizona v.
California, Arizona's tributaries were excluded from the accounting. From a policy perspective, it would have been improper to include them without taking into consideration California's northern
waters which can be made available to southern California. But
Congress could conceivably authorize allocations based on a total
regional accounting system which would also take into consideration
waters that can be imported from other regions.

